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JAMES C. WHITTAKER, 
Platn.tiff, 
VB. 
RICHARD H. SPENCER, (in whose name 
RICHARD LEO SPENCER, as Ad-
ministrator has been substituted, JOHN 
EDISON SPENCER, ELIZABETH A. 
TmBS, VORD SPENCER, IRWIN M. 
PRICE, SlMON HUGENTOBLER, (in 
whose place Que Jensen has been sub-
stitut~) INDIANOLA IRRIGATION 
COMPANY and the STATE OF UTAH, 
Def~. 
REPLY BBIEF OF APPELLANTS 
APPEALED FROM THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SANPETE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH. 
JOHN A. HOUGAARD, JUDGE 
ELIAS HANSEN 
.Aitone.eg for defendants and 
Ofltllebts Jolm Ediso-n Spe~r 
Gtki Eliaabeth, .A. Tibbs 
AJ,I.AN G. THURMAN 
.Aflo.rneg /Of' clef~ ONl appelkmt, 
BiC'hord Loo Spencer, .Aamim.isttratM 
J. VERNON ERICKSON 
DILWORTH WOOLLEY 
.Attonll6y& /Of' Pw,;.tiff 
JENSEN &; JENMN 
.A~s for defettdtmt and cross complainom,t, 
1 ttditMola Irri.gatiDta. Oompomty 
JOHN S. MCALLISTER 
.Atton.eg for def6flltlmtt Que J emen. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the State of Utah 
JAMES C. WHITTAKER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD H. SPENCER, (in whoRe name 
R~C_HARD LEO SPENqFm, as Ad- \ 
mm1strator has been suhsbtute<l, JOHN \ 
lj~DT~ON SPJ<jNC.F~R, ELIZABETH A. I 
TIBBS, VORD SPENCER, IRWIN M. 
PRlCl<~, SIMON HUGl<~NTOBL~~R, (in 
whose place Que .Jensen has been sub-
stitnted,) INDIANOLA IRRIGATION ,, 
COl\fPANY and the STATE OF UTAH, f 
Case No. 
7181 
Defen-dants. · 
There are some matters discussed in the briefs of 
the respon<lents and cross appellant which appellants 
deem of sufficient importance to require a reply brief. 
In order to avoid repetition we shall discuss all of tlw 
questions argued in the various briefs, in this, appellant's 
reply hrief. 
Tn the brief filed on behalf of Que Jensen it is con-
ceded, as we understand it, no elaim is made that he is 
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entitled to more than 55 acres or shares of class "A" 
water right. He makes no claim that he is entitled to any 
right to Class "B" water right. That being so there is 
no controversy between appellants and respondent, Que 
Jensen, as to the amount of water to which he is entitled. 
Appellants do contend, however, as pointed out in our 
original brief that the Jensen water right is represented 
by certificate No. 84 for 125 shares and not otherwise. 
It is argued on page 4G of the plain tiff and re-
spondent Whittaker's brief that because Whittaker had 
never become a stockholder of the Indianola Irrigation 
Company and because the appellants are not the owners 
of any class '' B '' water right they may not be heard to 
complain because Whittaker was awarded 60/1728th of 
the total flow of Thistle Creek and its tributa6es. It 
will be noted that in the mortgage given to Whittaker 
and in the various proceedings had in the attempted fore-
closure of that mortgage and in the sheriff's deed no 
mention is made of 60/1728ths of the flow of Thistle 
Creek and its tributaries. The language used in the 
various instruments is "together with sixty (60) shares 
in the waters of Indianola Creek, Thistle Creek and Rock 
Creek in addition to water now used for the irrigation 
of the above described lands.'' So far as the record shows 
R. H. Spencer never did own any class "B" stock. -While 
the evidence shows that he once owned 448 shares of 
class ''A'' stock he, so far as the evidence shows, never 
owned 448/1728th of the right to the use of the waters 
of Thistle Creek or its tributaries. 
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Moreover, it will be noted that by the terms of 
Article 5 of the articles of incorporation of the Indianola 
Irrigation Company it is proviued that from March 15th 
to .J nne 15th the owner of class '' B '' stock shall he en-
titlf~<l to the same quantity of water per share as the 
class "A" stock. (See plaintiff's J1~xhibit 7). Thus by 
awarding to Whittak•er 60/1728ths of the water of Thistle 
Creek he is given more water than he is entitled to and 
the same is taken from the other water right owners, 
hoth the class "A" anu class "B". The evidenee also 
~;hows that tlie waters of Thistle Creek and its tributaries 
were (1istributed by the Indianola Irrigation Company 
without regard as to whether the same was repr,esented 
hy shares of stock or otherwise. 
'I'he fact that the court below awarued to Whittaker 
G0/1728ths of the waters of Thistle Creek further sho\VS 
that the Whittaker mortgage is so vague and uncertain 
tliat neither the trial court nor counsel who drew the 
<1eerep can tell what water was mortgaged or foreclosed. 
Notwithstanding the evidence is all to the contrary 
counsel for vVhittaker bases much of his argument on 
the erroneou:; assumption that R. H. Spencer mortgaged 
28;) shares or acres of stock to the Federal Building and 
Loan As~;oeiation. 'l'hat mortgage was executed by H. l\L 
t-;pencer, lda Spencer, R. Leo Spencer, Grace Spencer, 
H. H. Spencer, Leo Harold flpencer and Fern Spencer. 
(:::lee gxhibi t G) '1'he land covered by that mortgage 
di<l not belong to R H. Spencer. That R H. Spencer 
mortg-age<l only 22:1 acres or slwres of water is made 
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undisputably evident by the assignment. (Irrigation Co. 
Exhibit 1) Neither of the appellants, John Edison Spen-
cer or Elizabeth A. Tibbs wer,e parties to that mortgage 
or the foreclosure thereof. 
On pages 13 to 15 of the Whittaker brief some com-
fort seems to be derived from giving bad names to the 
parties who are resisting plaintiff's claim. We are at 
a loss to see wherein such argument can add to plaintiff's 
claimed title to the water right claimed by him or detract 
from the appellants claim to such water right. It would 
have been very enlighting if counsel had cited some 
authority bearing upon the question of the materiality 
of what someone might think of his adversary has upon 
the question of the rights of the parties to the contro-
versy. vVe have always understood the law to be that 
such matters are not germane to a civil action. If plain-
tiff's title to the water right is valid or invalid it is so 
without regard as to who may or may not be the parties 
litigant. As to the Price affidavit as we pointed out in 
the original brief the same is not competent evidence 
to prove the absence of title in the appellants. 
Beginning on page 15 of respondent's brief it is 
argued that Hadlock had not lost his right to the use 
of the water right in controversy because he did not 
secure the sheriff'3 deed until December ~), H)i37. Plain-
tiff overlooks the fact that on October 29, 1933 Richard 
H. Spencer and Annie Spencer conveyed to appellant 
.John JiJdison Spencer the South one-half of the South-
east quarter of Section 5, Township 12 'South, Range 4 
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East, Salt Lake Meridian, together with 80 acres of 
water in what is known as Thistle Creek. This action 
was not commenced until July, 1941 which was more 
than 7 years after John Edison acquired the water right 
represented by certificate 73. John Edison Spencer 
owned, occupied and used the land and water right ad-
versely to the claim of the plaintiff and all the world for 
more than the statutory period. That the statutes of 
limitations ran against the plaintiff is the holding of 
this court in the case of Boucofski vs. Jacobson, 104 Pac. 
117; 36 U. 165. Neither of the appellants was a party to 
the Hadlock mortgage. 
Beginning on page 17 of the Whittaker brief it is 
argued that appellants are estopped from claiming that 
the ~Whittaker mortgage is void. We again call the at-
tention of the court to the fact that neither of the appel-
lants was a party to the Hadlock mortgage and so they 
could not be hehl to any covenants in that mortgage . 
.i\Ioreover if the mortgage is void, as we contend, it is 
void for all purposes. As we have pointed out in our 
original brief an instrument which is void is without 
legal effed. It is the same as if the instrument did not 
exist. 
vV e ltave heretofore in our original brief discusse(l 
the claimed disclaimer of the appellants. 'l'he claimed 
disclaimer did not apply to the water right then claimed 
by Whittaker. 'l'he principal difficulty with plaintiff's 
contention is that no one can tell what GO acres of water 
was the subject matter of that action. Apparently the 
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court in the judgment and decree in this case and counsel 
who drew the same abandoned all claim of a right to 
GO acres of water and concluded that plaintiff was en-
titled to 60/1728ths of the water of Thistle Creek and 
its tributaries. There is a ::mbstantial difference between 
60 acres or shares of water in Thistle Creek and 
60/1728ths thereof. 
It is further contended that appellants are estopped 
hy the judgment rendered in case No. 2888 Civil. Of 
course if that judgment is valid they are estopped but if 
void for uncertainty, as we contend, they are not 
estopped. A void judgment is the same as no judgment. 
That being so it cannot work on estoppel. To say that 
the judgment constitutes an estoppel is to give it at least 
some validity. We have no quarrel with the law cited on 
pages 21 to 24 of plaintiff's brief. The difficulty with the 
law there cited is that it has no application to the facts 
in this case. The law there cited applies to valid judg-
ments or judgments that are at most voidable. If a judg-
ment is void there is nothing to appeal from because in 
law it does not exist. A void judgment cannot settle any 
rights because in contemplation of law it does not exist. 
In this connection we direct the attention of the 
eourt to the findings and attempted judgment or order 
touehing the matter of the Spencers transferring water 
rertificates or conveying water right. \Ve have hereto-
fore, in our original brief, pointed out that such matters 
,.,~ere wiihout any il'l::;ues raised hy plaintiff's complaint 
and the answers thereto. l\loreover, such findings and 
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judgment do not fall within the rule of res adjudicata. 
In paragraph 14 of the decree of foreclosure in case 
2888 it is, among other things, provided that: "The court 
hereby retains jurisdiction of this cause for further 
hearing upon the rights asserted by the Indianola Irri-
gation Company against said defendants." So far as we 
have been able to ascertain the courts uniformly hold 
that the doctrine of res adjudicata applies only to final 
judgments. 31 Am. J ur., Sec. 436, page 95 and cases there 
cited. l\foreover, as pointed out in the original brief 
there is nothing which specifically awards to the plain-
tiff any right to the water right claimed by the appel-
lants, especially is that so as to the water right evidenced 
by certificates 72 and 73. If the court will read the de-
cree of foreclmmre in 2888 it will look in vain to find any 
language therein which foreclosed the mortgage on the 
water right represented by certificates 72 or 7i3 or any 
other water right that can be identified. 
Bcg·inning on page 2~) and extending to page 46 of the 
\Vhittaker brief much is said about the elusive character 
of a water right and of the difficulty of describing the 
same with any degree of accuracy. If a water right is 
appurtenant to land and as such real property all that 
one need to do is to describe the land to which it is ap-
pnrtenant. On the other hand if it is represented b~, 
shares of stock all that need be done is to describe the 
certificate giving the number thereof, the number of 
shares, the date of issue or other identification marks 
so tlmt rwrsons dealing with the right or the courts in 
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fixing the rights may determine with some degree of cer-
tainty what is the subject matter of the mortgage or 
conveyance. Anything short of that is certain to lead 
to confusion and makes property and property rights 
dependent upon a mere f:,ruess as to who is the owner 
thereof or has an interest therein. 
1t is the function of the law to prevent such results. 
If the mortgage in this case had described the land upon 
which the water right was used that plaintiff claims was 
covered by the mortgage we would not be here attacking 
the validity of the mortgage. 
If the Hadlock mortgage or the decree of foreclosure 
thereof is held to be valid no one could buy or take a 
mortgage on any part of the 448 shares or acres of 
water right owned by Spencer without running the risk 
of being confronted with the claim that the Hadlock mort-
gage covered the particular 60 shares or acres of such 
water right that may have been purchased or taken as 
security for a loan. 
On page 33 of the Whittaker brief there is a quota-
tion from the case of Payton, et al, vs. Browning, 290 
Pac. 253. The citation is apparently in error as no such 
case is reported in 290 Pacific. However, the citation 
sounds like good law. It is difficult to see how the law 
there announced can aid the plaintiff in this case. There 
is nothing in the mortgage here involved which indicates 
the particular water right that was intended to be cov-
ered hy the mortgage. Even if it should be concluded 
that the mortgage covered the water right evidenced hy 
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certificates 72 and 73 the uncertainty Is by no means 
removed. The most that can be said is that the field of 
uncertainty is narrowed down to 160 acres or shares in-
stead of 448. If as plaintiff seems to contend the mort-
gage covered the water which was appurtenant to the 
land upon which the water represented by certificates 72 
and 73 was used. If so which 60 acres of the 160 acres of 
water right was covered by the mortgage? No one can 
tell either from the language of the mortgage or from 
any evidence offered at the trial. To say that the mort-
gage covered any particular water right is a mere guess. 
If it covered the water represented by certificate 73 
then and in such case the Hadlock mortgage is barred 
because .John F~dison Spencer at the time the action was 
brought had owned and used the water for more than 7 
years. If it is the water represented by certificates 84 
or 8G for 12G and 160 shares or acres of water then and 
in such case the plantiff is precluded from asserting any 
such claim because he is bound by the foreclosure pro-
ceeding had by the Federal Building and Loan Associa-
tion. vV. H. Hadlock and .John A. I\falia, State Bank 
Commissioner, through whom plaintiff claims title were 
parties defendant in that proceeding. It is of course 
elernentar:· that a judf,rment is binding on those who 
are in privity with a party to a judgment. That leave,,, 
the water right represented by certificate number 72 
for disposition. Is there any evidence in the mortgage 
or for that matter in the evidence which shows or tends 
to show that the parties intended that the Hadlock mort-
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gage covered the water right represented by certificate 
numbered 72. 
In its finding numbered 19 the trial court found that 
the 55 shares of water right to Simon Hugentobler and 
the 600 shares of water right to the State Bank Com-
missioner should come out of certificates 72 and 73. J. R. 
2fi1 and 2G2. \Ve have already pointed out that John 
Edison Spencer had used that water for more than 7 
years. Such use was adverse to his father, R. H. Spencer, 
Hugentobler, the plaintiff and his predecessors in title. 
That being so neither plaintiff nor Hugentobler have 
any valid claim to that water. If Hugentobler 's right is 
to be taken out of certificate 72 there remains only 25 
shares for plaintiff from that source. To say that the 
parties to the Hadlock mortgage intended that the same 
should cover that mortgage is a mere guess, and is at 
variance with the claim made by the Bank Commissioner 
in his mortgage foreclosure. It is likewise at variance 
with the decree entered in this case. 
On pages 17 and 18 counsel for the plaintiff dis-
cusses the covenants contained in a mortgage. Even if we 
should concede all that is there said about covenants in 
a mortgage such concession would add nothing to the 
description contained in the Hadlock mortgage. The most 
that conl<l be said with respect to any covenants contained 
in the mortgage is that if the covenants were broken a 
cause of action for damages wonld accrue to the cove-
nantee. That is the remedy awanled for the hreaeh of a 
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covenant. Obviously neither the mortgage foreclosure 
nor this proceeding is such an action. 
On page 41 is quoted a provision from Compiled 
Laws of Utah, 1888 to the effect that : ''The right to the 
use of water may be measured by fractional parts of the 
whole source of supply, or by fractional parts, with 
limitation as to period of time when used." In our view 
the law just quoted maJ.::es against plaintiff in that it re-
quires that a right to the use of a water must be definite. 
The description of the water ri.ght mentioned in neither 
the Hadlock mortgage nor the decree of foreclosure de-
;.;cribe or even tend to describe a fractional part of any 
whole source of supply or limitation as to period of time 
of use. 
In his brief plaintiff seems to he under the impres-
sion that we are questioning the sufficiency of the langu-
age of 60 acres or shares of water right. That is not the 
basis for our contention. Our contention is that there 
is no way of determining or identifying any particular 
60 acres or shares out of the 448 acres or shares of water 
right that was owned by Spencer. Of course if Spencer 
had mortgaged or conveyed all of the 448 shares or acres 
of' water right which he owned there could be no un-
certainty or ambiguity. AJI that need be done in such 
case i.s to a:-;certain the number of shares or acres that 
\vere owned by Rpencer. VVhen the Federal Building and 
Loan Association conveyed i.ts water right to the Indian-
ola Irrigation Company H1e conveyance covered all its 
water right in Thistle Creek. Such a conveyance so far 
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as our investigation reveals has met with uniform judi-
cial approval. 
On page 44 of plaintiff's brief it is argued that 
Spencer mortgaged a water right to Thistle Creek. ~With 
that we agree. It is ah;o said that it is clear that Spencer 
did not intend to give a second mortgage. With that we 
cannot agree. It is by no means unusual to give a second 
mortgage or for a mortgagee to accept a second mort-
gage, especially when the mortgagor is in financial diffi-
culties as was R. H. Spencer when he gave the mort-
gage. 
It is also said that the water right mortgaged wa:-; on 
Section 5, the Wan;,;its Farm. That is where counsel for 
plaintiff not only engages in speculation but departs 
from the claim made by Hadlock in his complaint and 
from the decree of foreclosure in neither of which is 
mention made of certificates 72 or n or the land :-;ituated 
in Sections 5 or 8. 11oreover, even if the Hadlock mort-
gage may, contrary to our contention, claim that the 
Hadlock mortgage covers a water right represented by 
either certificates numbered 72 and 73 or land in Sec-
tions 5 or 8, which certificates or what land to which 
water is appurtenant is coverefl hy the mortgage. No one 
know:-; or has the means of finding out. It was evidently 
because of such unsurmountable difficulty that plaintiff 
was awarded 60/l728th of the water of Thistle Creek, 
an award \Vholly without support in the evidence. 
The conclusion that may be reached by this court 
is fraught with far reaching importance. If the Hadlock 
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mortgage and the decree of foreclosure thereof is held 
to be valid no one can safely purchase or take a mort-
gage on a water right lest some one who claims a lien 
on some indefinite part thereof shifts his claimed lien 
to such a part as may suit his convenience. 
The questions discussed in the brief of the Indianola 
Irrigation Company is for the most part discussed in our 
original brief and elsewhere in this brief. lt is true as 
stated in the brief of the Indianola Irrigation Company 
that Elizabeth A. Tibbs testified that she had never re-
ceived the twenty acres of primary water right men-
tioned in the deed dated May 31st, 1931 from R. H. 
Spencer and his wife, Annie H. Spencer. That conveyance 
is a faet in the case and shows that the father and mother 
of }frs. Tibbs intended that she, Mrs. Tibbs, should have 
a water right with the land which was conveyed. 
lt is further argued that appellants in the court be-
low claimed that all the certificates of water right were 
valid. It is true that appellants made such a claim and 
made the further claim that without regard to whether 
the certificates were or were not valid the water right 
represented by the certificates, in dispute, was appurten-
ant to tho land upon which said water right was and for 
many years last past had been used. 
It was the Indianola Irrigation Company that made 
tho attack on certificates No. 72 and 73. rt1hat Company 
seem:,; to take the inconsistent position that it can re-
pudiate the is:,;uance of the certificates and still maintain 
the elaim that Spencer conveyed to the Indianola Irriga-
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tion Company 160 acres or shares of water right in 
Thistle Creek. As we pointed out in our original brief 
the authorities hold that if a transaction or contract 
is rescinded it must be rescinded in toto. The law does 
not permit a partial rescision. If the transaction whereby 
certificates 72 and 73 are revoked it necessarily follows 
that the water right represented by such certificates is 
and a'lways has been appurtenant to the lands conveyed 
to John Edison Spencer and Elizabeth A. Tibbs. 
There are a few matters discussed in the cross appeal 
of Richard Leo Spencer, administrator, which we deem 
require a reply. On pages 43 to 45 it is argued that be-
cause of the provisions contained in case No. 2888 re-
straining Richard H. Spencer from disposing of certifi-
cates 72 and 7:~ or any other water rights held by him 
that any transfer of water rights in Thistle Creek and 
its tributaries are a nullity. \V e have already discussed 
that matter in our original brief' and shall not here reveat 
what is there said. 
Even conceding that the court, contrary to our con-
tention, had jurisdiction to make such an order the same 
could not possibly be of any aid to R H. Spencer's ad-
ministrator because; First, Richard H. Spencer had made 
two conveyances of the water represented by certificate 
No. 73 before the judgment in case 2888 civil was en-
tered. As far back as September 15, 1~)3;~ Richard H. 
Spencer an<l his wife, Annie H. Spencer, conveyed to 
John F~. Spencer the South one half of the Southwest 
Quarter of Section 5, Township 12 South, Range 4 ]1~ast, 
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Salt Lake Meridian, together with 80 acres of water in 
what is known as Thistle Creek. On October 29, 1933 a 
new deed was given to correct the description of the land. 
That deed also recites: "Together with 80 acres of water 
in what is known as Thistle Creek." Both deeds were 
placed on record soon after they were executed. (See 
transcript pages 51 and 52 and John I<Jdison Spencer's 
Exhibit 12) Second, neither R. H. Spencer nor his ad-
ministrators may now be heard to attack his own wilful 
acts on the ground that he was enjoined from conveying 
away his water rights. The provisions in the decree re-
lied upon were not intended for his protection. Nor may 
he nor his representative take advantage of his own acts 
upon the ground that he was enjoined from performing 
the same. The law in such particular is discussed at some 
length in 24 Am. Jur. page 263, Sec. 114; page 265, Sec. 
116; page 267, Sec. 118; page 289, Sec. 150; page 290, Sec. 
151. Numerous cases will be found collected in the foot 
notes to the text which support the same. 
'l'he authorities above cited in the mam deal with 
fraudulent conveyances. rrhe principles of law are how-
ever applicable here in that if the injunction, even if 
valid, was obviously intended to prevent the certificates 
or water rights owned hy them from coming into the pos-
;,;ession of an innocent purchaser for value. 
::\foreovcr the provisiom; of the claimed injunction 
doc>s not <~ven purport to enjoin the Spencers and the 
rl'ihhs from making transfers among themselves. As 
tlw.\· nn~ all enjoined it could not possihl~· make any dif-
16 
ference to any one for whose benefit the purported in-
junction was issued as to which one of the enjoined 
parties might hold the title to the water right referred 
to in the alleged injunction. It will be noted that they 
are all enjoined from making a transfer. There is noth-
ing in the language which purports to prevent them from 
making a transfer among themselves and no useful pur-
poses could be served by so restricting the right of Rich-
ard H. Spencer from dealing with his property. Cer-
tainly he could not be enjoined from making a will dis-
posing of his property, including his water right. By 
the same token when he knew that his end was near, to 
say that he was enjoined from fixing up his property 
among his children is, in our view, wholly without sup-
port in the records before the court. 
On pages 33 to 42 of the brief of the administrator 
it i8 argued that there was an over issue of stock by the 
Indianola Irrigation Company. Obviously there was no 
over issue directly to R. H. Spencer because at no time 
was there any stock issued to Hichard H. Spencer other 
than the certificate for 160 shares. 
It is argued in the brief of the administrator of the 
estate of R. H. Spencer that there is no competent evi-
dence showing that H. H. Spencer conveyed the 160 
shares of water evidenced by certificate 86 to John 
Edison Spencer. V{ e have discussed that phase of the 
case in our original brief. 
\Ve again direct the attention of the court to the 
fact that the administrator offered evidence as to what 
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John Edison Spencer had testified to on a prior hearing 
as to the water right in dispute. That being so the admin-
istrator in legal effect made John Edison Spencer his 
witness. The administrator could not procure from John 
Edison Spencer evidence favorable to his side of the 
controversy and then prevent John Edison Spencer from 
testifying as to matters that were unfavorable to the 
administrator. Under such circumstances the authorities 
teach that the incompetency of a witness is waived. 
On pages 50 to 58 of the administrator's brief it is 
contended that the water right represented by the cer-
tificates is not appurtenant to the land upon which the 
same was used throughout the years. We have covered 
that question in our original brief. We shall not repeat 
what is there said, except to again observe that at no 
time was the water right owned separate and apart from 
the owner of the land. 
·when the land was mortgaged the water right was 
mortgaged. When the mortgages were foreclosed such 
foreelosure was had on both the land and the water right 
used thereon. There were times when there was only 
a small flow of wa:ter and all of the water was put into 
one stream, but even then the water was always applied 
to the lands upon which the water had always been used. 
Indeed so far as the evidence shows there was no other 
land upon which it could be used. 
vVe submit that the judgment and decree of the 
eourt helow should he reversed to the end that the plain-
tiff is without right to the water right claimed by him, 
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that Simon Hugentobler be awarded only 55 shares or 
acres of water right; that the other water rights be 
awarded 80 shares or acres to Mrs. Tibbs and the re-
mainder to John Edison Spencer and that appellants be 
awarded their costs incurred in this court and in the 
court below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELIAS HANSEN, 
Attorney for Appellants. 
